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In this essay, the author seeks to understand the way in which a theology of culture can
develop an understanding ofnature. He begins by giving a definition for a theology ofculture,
using the work ofPaul Tillich. It is in defining, next, what is meant by nature that many of the
peculiarities and problems within this subject are discovered. Finally, it is only by looking at
the notion of historicality that he finds the answer to the question.
The story of Pygmalion and Galatea de-
serves close examination by theology, for it
brings to light many questions of theological
import. One quotation in Ovid's telling of
the story might pique interest:
[W|ith wondrous art he successrully
carves a figure out of snowy ivory,
giving it a beauty more perfect than that
of any woman ever born. . .. Often he
lifts his hands to the work to try
whether it be flesh or ivory; nor does he
yet confess it to be ivory.'
Pygmalion, in his sculpting, beckons us to ask
how we can understand the relation between
nature and culture, between that which is hu-
manly manufactured and that which is con-
ceived without fabrication by human hands.
And so, in light of Pygmalion and his love,
we ask: What can a theology of culture tell
us about nature?
In developing an answer, my argument
will proceed in five steps. The first step is
providing a brief definition of a theology
of culture, based on Paul Tillich "s work.
Next, a definition of nature, as it is under-
stood by theology, will be discussed. How-
ever, an unambiguous definition of nature
cannot be given; instead, I must recognize
that nature is understood through two con-
tradictory definitions. The third step of the
argument will examine part of the founda-
tion of these two definitions. Both defini-
tions of nature are structured around two
tensions found in the conception of nature.
It is only through recognizing the underly-
ing cause of these tensions that one can
understand what is meant by the ambigu-
ous concept of nature. The basis of these
tensions therefore allows the place of na-
ture in a theology of culture to be recog-
nized. The fourth step of this argument is
to explicate such a basis in the concept of
historicality, using Gordon Kaufman's un-
derstanding of biohistoricality and the de-
scription of history as both event and nar-
rative. The final step of this argument,
closely tied to the fourth, will show that
human persons are simultaneously histori-
cal and natural beings—but that nature, too,
is historical and biological. Therefore, a the-
ology of culture must negotiate an under-
standing of nature in light of two different
dimensions of history: (1) nature as non-
participatory in the transcendence of the di-
mension of narrative, and (2) nature as par-
ticipatory in the historicality of event.
Through this argument, I will show that na-
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ture and humanity share certain dimensions
of historicaHty, while other dimensions of
historicahty allow a transcendence of human-
ity over nature. Since history provides the
foundation for culture, a theology of culture
can understand nature by recognizing that
culture and nature share a common
historicaHty (as event), while humanity finds
its transcendence from nature through
historicahty (as narrative).
A theology of culture
The starting point is a brief definition of
a "theology of culture." Paul Tillich begins
his essay, "On the Idea
of a Theology of Cul-
ture," by describing the
relationships between
various disciplines in
light of cultural analysis.
With this beginning,
Tillich wishes to ac-
knowledge a possible
starting point to aid in
understanding what is
meant by a theology of
culture. Here, Tillich 's
interpretation of the difference between the
study of culture and the natural sciences is
found: contrary to the natural sciences, the
cultural sciences are based on the fact that
"the standpoint of the systematic thinker be-
longs to the heart of the matter itself."- There
are no strictly universal concepts within the
study of culture—these universals (if not
useless) are simply hidden or disguised nor-
mative concepts with some form of concrete
basis in reality.
Thus, one is directed by Tillich to a very
specific definition of a theology of culture: a
"religious interpretation of the autonomous
culture and its development" that is based on
"the presupposition... that in every cultural
creation... an ultimate concern is expressed,
and that it is possible to recognize the uncon-
scious theological character of it."'' Another
way to explain the idea of a theology of cul-
ture, in Tillich's terms at least, is to recognize
that culture must be viewed in light of reli-
gion as "ultimate concern." He writes:
Religion as ultimate concern is the
meaning-giving substance of culture,
and culture is the totality of forms in
which the basic concern of religion
expresses itself. In abbreviation:
religion is the substance of culture,
culture is the form of religion.
A theology of culture, recognizing that theol-
ogy has no domain solely for itself, is the task
of finding the "depth dimension" within the
human sphere.
From the standpoint of this definition
—
and recognizing that it holds certain limita-
tions—what is the relationship between a the-
Our experience of nature must be based
on categories and concepts that we place
upon it, such that nature becomes raw
material (or ^^standing-reserve'^ in
Heidegger's words) or a completely
mysterious, devotional Other.
ology of culture and "nature"? Tillich, in "On
the Idea of a Theology of Culture," says:
At this point now the question could be
raised why the whole of the work [of a
theology of culture] is limited to the
analysis of culture and why nature (or
technology) is excluded. The answer is
that for us nature can only become an
object through the medium of culture, if
at all.... The essence of nature is quite
out of our reach, and we cannot even
comprehend it sufficiently to be able to
speak positively of such an essence.
But as nature only becomes a reality to
us through culture, we are justified in
speaking exclusively of "cultural
theology" and in rejecting a concept
such as "natural theology." Any
religious substance or import that may
exist in nature lies in the cultural
functions insofar as these are related to
nature.^
Though it might seem from this quotation
that nature (as an object of study, at least) is
possibly beyond the reach of a theology of
culture, Langdon Gilkey's work. Nature, Re-
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ality, and the Sacred, shows that a tlieology
of culture can be utilized to look at the rela-
tionship between nature, science, and theol-
ogy. For the present purposes, it is important
to note that nature has a role in theology be-
cause, among other things, nature is piirt of
the structure of culture:
Thus all of culture—art, myth, morals,
politics, practical crafts, and even
science, all of the facets of spirit and
reason—stretches back into the dimness
and mystery of matter, of nature as our
source and ground.'^
The following discussion attempts to take se-
riously the insights of Tillich and Gilkey, by
exploring the place of nature in a theology of
culture—in other words, by exploring the re-
lations that make possible a discovery of a
sense of the divine in nature, taking religion
as Tillich saw it: "Religion is not a special
function of man's spiritual life, but it is the
dimension of depth in all of its functions.'"*^
On the very concept of nature
While defining a theology of culture might
seem relatively sti*aightforward, finding a suit-
able definition of nature is not. In fact, the
very concept of nature is embedded within a
paradox, as Ezarim Kohak points out in terms
of an understanding of the human ecological
place:
Humans cannot be both the species that
sets the rules for the world
(anthropocentrism)—and at the same
time just one species among many
within that world (ccoccntrism).'
It must be conceded that there is always an
ambiguity in a concept of nature, because in
the our relationship to nature we are unable
to ascertain the being of nature qua nature.
Our experience of nature can never be of a
soil that relates strictly to an essence of na-
ture, since we can experience nature—how-
ever we define it—only tlirough cognitive and
cultural schema. Theologically and philo-
sophically, the result of this ambiguity is that
we have not one operative definition of na-
ture, but two. These two definitions are some-
what contradictory, but both are used in our
conception of nature.
The first definition steins from what
Kohiik identifies as the anthropocentric: it is
the definition of nature as separated, indepen-
dent, and Other. It is nature as that which is
not part of the cultural and societal world of
the human person. Kohak reveals the impli-
cations of this definition when suggesting
three ways of experiencing nature in this light:
"as an awesome presence to be placated and
worshipped, as a working partner to be un-
derstood and respected, and as a raw material
to be used and exploited."* In each of these,
the human person is seen as separated from
nature, while able to manipulate or otherwise
relate to it as an object of perception. This
manipulation shows how nature as Other, as
against the human cultural sphere, must be
taken into the cultural. Ultimately, nature is
subverted into a sameness with the cultural.
This objectification of nature has scientific,
philosophical, and religious consequences.
Harold Oliver comments that, since the En-
lightenment, the concept of nature has been
under the "custody" of Newtonian science as
a mechanistic and deterministic object, "be-
reft of its vitality and value." In light of this,
Oliver continues, the view of nature by theo-
logians also hardened:
Theologians were made increasingly
aware that many religions of the world
stressed harmony with nature, but could
discount this as paganism, just as they
rejected Romanticism's tlirlation with
nature as an excrescence of paganism.'
Nature, as understood through this first
definition, contains an aspect that has no posi-
tive definition; instead, it is defined as that
which is not culture—the raw, untreated and
unmediated object, which is found prior to its
human transformation into artifact or tool.
Joyce Carol Oates expresses this definition
of nature—and the paradoxical need to ex-
plain this facet of nature as the Other through
cultural means—in the essay, "Against Na-
ture":
It has no sense of humor: in its beauty,
as in its ugliness, or its neutrality, there
is no laughter. It lacks a moral
purpose. It lacks a satiric dimension,
registers no irony. lis pleasures lack
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resonance, being accidental; its horrors,
even when premedilaied, are equally
perfunctory, "red in tooth and claw" et
cetera, h hictcs a symbolic subtext
—
excepting that provided by man. It has
no (verbal) language. It has no interest
in ours. It inspires a painfully limited
set of responses in "nature-writers"
—
REVERENCE, AWE, PIETY, MYSTI-
CAL ONENESS. It eludes us even as
it prepares to swallow us up, books and
all.'"
This side of nature, insofar as we confront
it as a radical Otherness that is apart from the
cultural framework of the human, is experi-
enced only after it is mediated tlirough a cul-
tural transformation into "our image"-—our
image as builders, producers, etc. In other
words, our inability to see this Other as itself
comes from our separateness and estrange-
ment from it; our experience of it must be
based on categories iind concepts that we place
upon it, such that nature becomes raw mate-
rial (or "standing-reserve" in Heidegger's
words) or a completely mysterious, devotional
Other. In either case, nature is to be used as
material for cultural upbuilding. At the same
time, nature as Other is not only that material
which we use for the upbuilding of culture
—
it is also what reminds us that we are alien-
ated and separated from nature by virtue of
the very same upbuilding.
But I have shown only one side of nature.
A second definition, as equally valid as the
first, assumes that nature is the totality of all
objects and processes—in other words, it is a
regulative idea similar to Kant's understand-
ing of world, as Gordon Kaufman suggests."
This second definition resonates with what
Kohak identifies as the ecocentric. Perhaps
the most important aspect of this definition is
this: because nature is a totality, there is no
differentiation between the natural and the
non-natural. According to this definition of
nature, nothing can be classified in the latter
category; nature, in this sense, is the suin to-
tal of every process and object. Nature, in
this second sense, is in many respects con-
trary to the nature portrayed by the first defi-
nition. By the second definition, nature can-
not be Other, nor can it be simply raw mate-
rial, nor is it separated from the human cul-
tural sphere. In sum, another side of nature is
present, insofiu" as we are participants in the
processes of nature, i.e., in the totality of the
world. Through being, we share a degree of
relation to all other beings; therefore, we need
not mediate our relation to other objects
through cultural manipulation and transforma-
tion of otherness, so long as we all participate
in the common structure of nature. '-
As stated above, both definitions are used
in an overall conception of nature, though the
two are contradictory in some respects. Just
as the first definition presents the human as
separated from the world, the second defini-
tion presents the human as pait of nature, find-
ing the human world continuous with the natu-
ral. While the first definition presents the
cultural structures of humanity as using the
natural for raw material, the second defini-
tion points out that, in some sense, the very
fact that human beings participate in nature
means that human culture is a natural process.
In sum, we should value Gordon Kaufman's
treatment of the meaning of nature as, in some
sense, bifurcated. Kaufman points out that
the concept of nature has come to be portrayed
as a "double entendre," with humans at home
in nature and yet above it."
Two tensions in these definitions
of nature
Theologically speaking, both of the above
definitions are integral parts of an understand-
ing of nature. Therefore, in order to resolve
the conflicts that are present between these
two definitions of nature, some of the struc-
tural elements of this "double entendre" must
be understood. Interestingly, we perhaps al-
ready can understand how this step will lead
to the final goal of understanding the relation
between a theology of culture and nature. For
the following is not a discussion of nature in
its essence, but instead a reflection upon how
to identify and conceptualize the essence of
nature—yet conceptualization is in some ways
a cultural phenomenon. Thus, I now turn to a
delineation of two tensions that participate in
the ambiguity of the concept of nature: first,
a tension in what it means to know nature;
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and second, a tension in the understanding of
the human relationship with nature.
The first tension comes from speculation
upon how the essence or the ontological im-
port of nature can be accessed. In other
words, the question that must now be asked
is how we are able to know nature. We are
confronted with an epistemological question
regarding our intuition of nature reminiscent
of the problem Kant seeks to answer in the
Critique of Pure Reason; namely, the ques-
tion of the conditions for the possibility of
any knowledge—essential or phenomenal
—
about the world we presume to perceive
through our senses. Therefore, this first ten-
sion in the definition of nature finds concrete
manifestation in the atnbiguity of the descrip-
tion of nature as either a mechanistic and
quantifiable object, or as that which is un-
tamed by human technique—as vibrant, as
awesome.
If the first tension is in terms of how we
come to know nature both in form and con-
tent, then the second tension is centered on
how we human beings come to relate to na-
ture. This second tension is a bit more com-
plex, as might be surmised by the fact that
Alreadyy a clear break between the human
sphere and nature may be seen, based on
the presumption that nature is bereft of
teleology and a matrix of value. Teleology
and value are based in culture and are,
thus, at home only in human cultural
structure.
the definitions of nature are often reducible
to the relationship we assume humankind is
to have with nature. This tension is not epis-
temological, in that it is not based on our abil-
ity to comprehend or make conceptual de-
scriptions of nature. Instead, this second ten-
sion is anthropological, because it develops
in light of our conception of the human con-
dition. We have already encountered the con-
crete example of this tension in certain aspects
of Kaufman's "double entendre": humanity
is a part of nature, yet humanity transcends
nature. In religious and theological circles,
the question of the human relationship with
nature has been much discussed as a conse-
quence of Lynn White's lecture published in
Science, "The Historical Roots of Our Ideo-
logic Crisis." '*
The problem that the second tension con-
fronts is this: what is primary in theological
anthropology—participation or transcen-
dence? Neither answer seems tenable on its
own, as exemplified in Alfred Crosby's book.
Ecological Imperialism. Crosby explains the
background, propagation, and ultimate domi-
nance of invasive European plant and animal
species throughout temperate zones around
the globe. While Europeans brought cultural
artifacts and institutions which supplanted
their counterparts in the native societies of
colonized lands, there was a similar conquest
occurring—in some cases by design, in oth-
ers by accident—on the natural level. The
historical importance of these "natural" trans-
plants are paramount, such that Crosby as-
sumes anyone attempting to explain the suc-
L cess of European ad-
I vance must not only
take into account the
"demoralization and
I often the annihilation
of the indigenous
populations," but also






concomitantly the weeds—that transformed
naturally occurring ecosystems in their own
image. Thus, Crosby sets foilh a dialectic
between culture and nature: culture (in the
form of European expansion) stands over and
influences the so-called natural surroundings,
even as culture (in the form of native societ-
ies) is often helplessly and inextricably present
within the overall natural sphere. In the con-
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temporary world, there are similar situations
showing the continuing ambiguity of the hu-
man relationship with nature, from the prob-
lem of introduced Zebra mussels in the Great
Lakes, to the invasion of North American
coastal salt marshes by the Eurasian invasive
plant species Phragmites austnilis, to the al-
teration of the culture of the Hill peoples of
Orissa in light of a change in their natural
world."
Of history in nature, and nature in
history
At this point, two very different tasks
have been accomplished. First of all, a
History, as an aspect of the human condi-
tiony functions as the ground and ordering
of value, as that which mediates the expe-
rience of life—in other words, as the
ground of the cultural life within which
humanityfinds itself inextricably meshed.
Tillichian theology of culture has been de-
scribed. Secondly, the fact has been set for-
ward that we often have two definitions of
nature. Not only has the content of these defi-
nitions been summarized, but also the two
tensions structurally working behind them.
Now, I would like to move to another struc-
tural question: what stands at the crux of these
two tensions? In answer, I would like to sug-
gest that it is history that stands between the
two. Further, in order to understand nature,
the role that history plays in both nature and
humanity must be understood. In order to
accomplish this task, I would like to first look
at Gordon Kaufman's idea that humans are
'"biohistorical" beings, as defined through a
description of the "theological problem of
nature" in his influential article, "The Con-
cept of Nature: A Problem for Theology."
Next, I would like to explore briefly Jan
Patocka's concept of history, particularly in
light of his statement that history is both
event and narrative. Patocka provides a
helpful emendation for Kaufman's work. We
find through Kaufman's work that human
beings must relate to the world through the
historical. Yet nature, in its relationship with
culture, has some participation in history as
well. Also, historicality can be understood
both as event and narrative. Through this
discussion of the historical, a better under-
standing is provided of both the above-de-
scribed tensions. History, then, assists in
better defining nature and, in so doing, points
out the way that nature can be understood
by a theology of culture.
Kaufman does not
wish to construct an
ecological theology in
"The Concept of Na-
ture," but instead at-
tempts "to get clearer
the structure, connec-
tions, and implications
of the concept of nature
as these bear on its
theological employ-
M ment." "' As I have al-
9 ready said, Kaufman
points out the ambiguity of the concept of
nature. He explains that this double entendre
illustrates the following:
Nature appears to be a nonteleological,
nonaxiological order within which
emerges purposive and valuing
activity.'''
In other words, while nature can be viewed as
a complex of processes and functions, this
value-free system of nature participates in the
creation and sustenance of a teleological or-
der of value within which humanity finds it-
self. This participation by nature shows the
unique problem that nature presents for the-
ology. Nature, "which does not have built into
it the dimensions of purpose, value, and mean-
ing. . .," is a backdrop for human life.
The notion of God, on the other hand, as
an agent characterized by freedom and
purposiveness and love, is based on the
model of human freedom and agency as
experienced within society and culture."*
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Already, a clear break between the human
sphere and nature may be seen, based on the
presumption that nature is bereft of teleology
and a matrix of value. Teleology and value
are based in culture and are, thus, at home
only in human cultural structure.
Until the modern era, God and nature could
be related to each other through the theologi-
cal concept of creation—meaning, a finite na-
ture dependent on an infinite God. However,
the Enlightenment ushered in a conception of
nature as infinite. The conception of nature as
infinite is present in the second definition of
nature, insofar as this definition sees nature as
an all-encompassing totality of past, present,
and future processes and objects. Because our
worldview cannot have two infinites, the
conceptualization of nature as infinite initiated
a struggle between the concepts of God and
nature. But in this struggle, notice that human
persons remain, in some sense, transcendent
of nature. To justify this transcendence,
Kaufman highlights the importance of human-
ity as historical—in other words, as develop-
ing out of social and cultural processes in ad-
dition to biological ones. Borrowing from
Hegel, Kaufman sees that freedom, morality,
and consciousness develop only in light of his-
tory, meaning that humans have "another, new
'historical nature.'" '"^ In sum, the importance
of history must be recognized through the de-
marcation of humankind as distinctively
"biohistorical." To be sure, human beings are
shaped through evolutionary and biological
processes. However, as Kaufman writes:
\n significant respects, thus, our
historicity... is a distinctive mark of our
hunianness: we are beings shaped
decisively by a history that has given us
power ourselves to shape future history
in significant ways.-"
The conclusion is the following: humans,
as biohistorical beings, by necessity interface
with the world through the historical. Cer-
tainly, humans have a natural aspect, but tran-
scend the natural through a dimension of his-
tory. History, as an aspect of the human con-
dition, functions as the ground and ordering
of value, as that which mediates the experi-
ence of life—in other words, as the ground of
the cultural life within which humanity finds
itself inextricably meshed. Thus, Kaufman
—
by claiming that humans are biohistorical
is asserting the following:
...that it is, above all, the high develop-
ment of our historicity that gives our
existence its most distinctively human
character.-'
This insight into the historical gives insight
into the problem of what was described as the
second, anthropological tension in the defini-
tion of nature, by providing an avenue to over-
come the apparent antinomy presented in that
tension. Indeed, in some respects the human
is participant in nature and continuous with
it, yet the human is able to transcend nature
in some way, by virtue of the historical.
Yet, we still have not found an understand-
ing of the first tension described above, but have
only disccwered an avenue toward comprehend-
ing the second. In other words, we use the his-
torical to show how humans can be both par-
ticipating in nature and simultaneously transcen-
dent of it. However, this difference does not
show how we can understand nature in terms
of our first tension—in part because we have
not explored the relationship between nature and
historicality. History acts as ground of cultural
structures and forms—but is history itself me-
diated through culture, and is there a sense in
which nature also is mediated by historicality?
With this question, we are left with a question
concerning Kaufman's conception: could value
or freedom—regarded as manifested through
culture—be found within nature qua nature?
Could history not in some way ground value
and freedom within nature, just as it has done
within the human cultural sphere?
Jan Patocka's Heretical Essays in the Phi-
losophy ofHistory might be able to assist us
at this point. Patocka, in a work heavily influ-
enced by Husserl and Heidegger, seeks to de-
scribe the transition from what he terms as
the prehistorical to the historical. Within this
movement from one to the other, we go from
a naive acceptance of nature in the
prehistorical to a "problem of the natural
world" present in the historical." Writing in
a Heideggerian vein, Patocka states the fol-
lowing:
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The things we encounter are grasped as
themselves, though not independently of
the emergence of essentia! concealment
into openness, hi the play of manifesta-
tion/unconcealment. they show them-
selves as what they are, thus demonstrat-
ing their seriousness. Their manifesta-
tion, however, is itself historical, in two
ways: as the uncovering of what is and as
the emergence of the structures of being
which thus cannot stand out into
openness other than historically.-^
The natural world, by participating in
unconcealment (a concept illuminated by
Heidegger in such works as "The Question
Concerning Technology" '"'), must be contex-
tualized within history. The natural world is, in
some sense, also biohistorical—at least after the
human has gone through the passage from the
naive prehistorical to the historical.
However, this recognition of the
historicality of nature does not negate
Kaufman's hypothesis that the human person
holds a unique, transcendent place in the
world. Rather, through Patocka's differen-
tiation between the meaning of events and the
meaning of narratives we find how humans
transcend nature.
However, the meaning of a narrative
about events is different from the
meaning of what is narrated. The
meaning of events is an achievement of
those who act and suffer, while the
meaning of a narrative lies in under-
standing the logical formations pointing
to those events.''
The historical human comes out of a devel-
opment of a narrative that mediates the his-
torical event; for Patocka , the polis, the con-
cept of polemos, the development of Chris-
tianity, and finally the modem scientific/math-
ematical outlook all have decisively influ-
enced the narratives that are overlaid on na-
ture and the events of history. Meanwhile,
nature still participates in history as event,
thereby allowing the human relationship to
nature to be conducted within the events of
the world, while we are able to transcend the
historicality of event through the human or-
dering of the historicality of narrative.
A better understanding of nature can per-
haps be developed if no attempt is made to col-
lapse the meaning of history as event into that
of history as narrative, hideed, by assuming
that history as event can be present in nature
qua nature, then nature is seen to participate at
least indirectly in the structuring of culture,
because culture is developed on the basis of
history. At the same time, human persons are
are seen to be distinct from nature in their
historicality. This relationship between human-
ity, nature, and history has ramifications regard-
ing the two tensions mentioned above, for im-
plicit in those two tensions is the fact that na-
ture is conceptualized both as necessarily me-
diated through culture and yet as independent
of culture. In order for an understanding of the
second tension to be comprehended in light of
the concept of biohistoricality, then, we can be
seen to relate to nature through history. At the
same time, it must be accepted that there is a
bifurcation within the concept of history be-
tween the event and nanative, with nature par-
ticipating in the event of history but not in the
narrativity of history. Therefore, neither par-
ticipation nor transcendence can have the final
word in our relation to nature; instead, both are
participants in a dialectic of history. As a re-
sult of this dialectic, the first tension finds new
significance. I would like to suggest that a his-
torical understanding of freedom and teleology
are aligned with the narrative, while value and
meaning are embedded in the events of history
themselves (unfortunately, due to space, we
cannot explore this alignment further). By vir-
tue of these alignments, we can understand
nature mediated in temis of human freedom and
teleological development as found in the
enculturedness of history as narrative. We are
also able to experience (within this cultural
embeddedness of history) nature directly in
terms of value and meaning as found in history
as event. In other words, to say that we are
simultaneously historical and natural beings can
make sense only insofar as the historical can
attempt to ascertain the natural through both
dimensions of history: through the separate-
ness of culture in temis of the transcendence
found in the historicality of narrativity and
through the participation and presence of both
nature and culture in the historicality of event.
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Just as new meaning is found within the
structural features (as seen in light of two ten-
sions) of the conception of nature, renewed
meaning and complementaiity are also found
in the two definitions of nature. By virtue of
this grounding of culture in history, a theo-
logical understanding of nature can be utilized
that conies from both definitions given above:
( 1 ) nature in its function as raw material and
Other, and (2) nature as totality and continu-
ous with the human cultural sphere. It is here
that the potential religious dimension present
within nature begins to be appreciated, as seen
in an insight from Ezarim Kohak's important
work, The Embers and the Stars. Kohak sees
that value and meaning enter into the world
through an inbreaking of eternity into time.
This vertical dimension appears in the natu-
ral world, insofar as the natural world is a
world bounded in time and history as event.
Therefore, the divine is found in the
inbreaking of eternity into the events of his-
tory, into a dimension of history in which na-
ture and humanity are conjoined.
Further, the historicality of nature is found
to allow nature to be the bearer of value, in-
sofar as nature participates in the inbreaking
of eternity. Nature acts as an avenue for a
recovery of value, since, as Kohak writes:
To recover the truth of value it is crucial
to bracket the reductive framework of
temporal sequence and to see being in
its reference to the eternity which ever
intersects with time, defining the now
within it. Within time, that now would
be indistinguishable from the endless
series of such nows. It stands out as the
moment in which eternity intersects
time.-^
Thus, nature has what Kohak calls a moral
sense—something to which we can enter into
relation in time:
The moral sense of nature, and not that
alone, but all whereof we have spoken,
is not its own, generated by its
processes. It is the presence of God
—
the Christians would speak of the Holy
Spirit—and a gift of Nature's Creator.
Nature's gift to humans, in turn, is not
its own but God's gift which nature
mediates."
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